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Encouraging public reporting of suspicious behaviour on rail networks 
Ongoing targeting of mass transit networks and the challenges associated with policing 
these large open systems means that encouraging public vigilance and reporting on 
railways is a counter-terrorism priority. There is, however, surprisingly little research 
on motivations and barriers to cooperating with the police in this context. This paper 
contributes to this under-researched field by presenting the findings of a survey 
experiment which examined (1) the role of uncertainty as a barrier for reporting 
suspicious behaviour on rail networks, (2) whether drivers for cooperation established 
in the context of traditional crime hold for reporting suspicious behaviour at train 
stations, and (3) whether the UK ‘See it. Say it. Sorted’ campaign is effective in 
encouraging reporting. Data was collected in the UK and Denmark, national contexts 
with differing baseline attitudes towards the police and experiences of transit terrorist 
attacks, to assess the extent to which public vigilance campaigns need to be adapted to 
address local concerns. Results suggest that future public vigilance campaigns should 
address differences in lay and official definitions of suspicious behaviour to reduce 
uncertainty as a barrier to reporting. They also demonstrate that the influence of 
procedural justice on cooperation via its influence on social identification with the 
police holds beyond the context of community policing and reporting of traditional 
crime. However, other drivers are likely to be more important for determining reporting 
suspicious behaviour on rail networks, including perceived benefits of reporting. 
Theoretical and practical implications of cross-national differences and similarities in 
responses are discussed. 
Keywords: procedural justice; social identity; cooperation; counter-terrorism policing 
 
Ongoing targeting of public transportation systems by both terrorist groups and lone 
actors since the 2004 Madrid train bombings - for example attacks on buses and trains 
in London, Moscow, Minsk, Istanbul, Brussels, Madhya Pradesh and Saint Petersburg – 
coupled with the security challenges associated with policing these complex networks, 
means that mass transit systems remain a counter-terrorism priority (Loukaitou-Sideris 
et al., 2006, Kappia et al., 2009). Trains and major transport hubs are a frequent 
terrorism target due to their level of accessibility and the impracticality of implementing 




airport-style security screening in these contexts (Riley, 2004, Kappia et al., 2009, 
Donald, 2013, Carter et al., 2016). Furthermore, crowded train carriages and subways 
maximise the number of potential casualties despite limited attack means (Jenkins and 
Trella, 2012), which is consistent with an increasing trend for terrorist groups to aim for 
mass casualties to provoke an emotional response from the public (Kappia et al., 2009, 
Europol, 2018). 
The scale of mass transit systems makes them a challenging environment for 
policing, as it is not possible to have police officers assigned to every station. 
Consequently, it is often passengers who will observe suspicious items and activities. 
Ensuring public awareness and willingness to report in this context is therefore an 
important aspect of rail security (Donald, 2013). Despite this, there has been reluctance 
in some countries, such as Spain and Denmark, to undertake large-scale vigilance 
campaigns due to concerns about scaring the public or receiving an overwhelming 
number of reports (Loukaitou-Sideris et al., 2006, Parker et al., 2017). Furthermore, 
counter-terrorism communication campaigns may also unintentionally contribute to 
stigmatisation of ‘suspect communities’ (Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011, Mythen, 2012, 
Parker et al., 2017). Nevertheless, public outreach activities to encourage vigilance and 
reporting on rail networks are widely used in countries including France, Japan, the 
United Kingdom and the United States (Loukaitou-Sideris et al., 2006, Jarvis and 
Lister, 2010). In the UK, which experienced extensive IRA attacks on rail infrastructure 
for nearly three decades, there has been a long-standing policy of encouraging the 
public to report unattended items or suspicious behaviour on railways. For example, the 
2004 ‘If you suspect it, report it’ and the 2011 ‘See anything suspicious’ poster 
campaigns.  




The most recent British Transport Police campaign to focus on protective 
security - ’See it. Say it. Sorted’ - was launched in November 2016. This campaign was 
designed by the UK government, police and the rail industry to raise awareness of the 
role of the public in keeping themselves and others safe. It echoes the language of the 
US Department of Homeland Security ‘If you see something, Say something’ campaign, 
but builds upon this and on previous UK messaging by adding a ‘sorted’ element to 
reassure members of the public that the police will respond to reports. Reflecting a shift 
in terrorist tactics towards suicide attacks, it also provides greater emphasis than earlier 
campaigns on the need to look out for suspicious behaviours associated with hostile 
reconnaissance as well as unattended items. This is important, as people are less likely 
to report in situations of uncertainty and terrorism-related suspicious behaviour is more 
difficult to recognise than traditional criminal activity (FEMA, 2012). Furthermore, 
there is evidence to suggest that the public are less willing to engage with counter-
terrorism issues than everyday security concerns on public transport (Rogers et al., 
2009a, Rogers et al., 2009b) and less willing to report ambiguous terrorism-related 
behaviours (e.g. reading terrorist material) than more explicit indicators, such as 
overhearing overt attack planning (LaFree and Adamczyk, 2017). 
Although a great deal of effort has been made since the 9/11 attacks on the 
World Trade Center to encourage the general public in Western states to take an active 
role in countering terrorism, there is surprisingly little academic research on motivations 
and barriers to public reporting in this context, both for terrorism related matters in 
general (Gallagher, 2010, FEMA, 2012) and in relation to mass transit security in 
particular (Loukaitou-Sideris et al., 2006). There is, however, an extensive literature on 
encouraging public reporting for general crime control, which has established a strong 
positive association between procedural justice (based on perceptions regarding the 




fairness of police procedures) and willingness to cooperate with the police (Lind and 
Tyler, 1988, Tyler and Huo, 2002, Tyler, 2007, Murphy et al., 2008, Bradford, 2014). 
Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that this holds for the reporting of 
terrorism related activities, at least for communities that are the focus of counter-
terrorism policing (Tyler et al., 2010, Huq et al., 2011, Cherney and Murphy, 2013, 
Murphy et al., 2017). 
The primary aim of the current study is to contribute to a better understanding of 
the factors that influence public reporting of suspicious activity related to hostile 
reconnaissance on rail networks. Specifically, to examine (1) the role of uncertainty as a 
barrier for reporting suspicious behaviour in train stations, (2) whether drivers for police 
cooperation identified in the general crime literature can help explain reporting 
behaviour in train stations, and (3) whether the ’See it. Say it. Sorted’ campaign is 
effective in encouraging reporting of suspicious behaviour in train stations. To assess 
the extent to which public vigilance campaigns can successfully employ generic calls to 
action in different national contexts, we collected survey data in the UK and Denmark.  
Differences in the ways in which railways are policed, experiences of terrorism, 
exposure to public vigilance campaigns and in general attitudes towards police and 
crime reporting make the UK and Denmark ideal comparison countries for examining 
(a) whether procedural justice theory holds in the context of counter-terrorism policing 
on railways, and (b) assessing the extent to which generic messages need to be adapted 
to take into consideration local concerns. The UK rail transport system is approximately 
ten times larger than the Danish network (Carter et al. 2008), but despite its scale, 
overall crime on UK railways (as in Denmark) is low, with only 19 crimes recorded for 
every million journeys made in 2017/18 (British Transport Police, 2018).  The UK 
public has, however, had more direct experience of terrorist attacks on mass 




transportation systems, from the sustained IRA mainland bombing campaign which led 
to bins being removed from London’s railway stations in 1981, to the 2005 bus and tube 
bombings which killed fifty-two people and injured more than seven hundred.  
 
The See it, Say it, Sorted campaign was launched in the wake of the controlled 
explosion of a potentially viable device at North Greenwich station in London and 
British Transport Police continue to foreground counter-terrorism as a key challenge for 
policing Britain’s railways (British Transport Police, 2018). In contrast, Denmark does 
not have an extensive history of attacks on mass transit and protective advice for rail 
passengers in this context primarily focuses on safety in relation to avoiding accidents 
on platforms when highspeed trains are passing (e.g. the Hovedløselille (Headlessville) 
social campaign). The Danish public are therefore less likely to have been exposed to 
vigilance requests or to consider counter-terrorism as a high priority on railways. 
Although the Danish public have less experience of this type of terrorism and less 
exposure to counter-terrorism communications, European Social Survey data indicates 
high levels of police cooperation in this context (Hough et al., 2013) and Denmark has 
been identified as having exceptionally positive attitudes towards the police (Torrente et 
al., 2017). Danish respondents may therefore be particularly receptive to cooperating 
with requests for information from the police. 
Factors influencing suspicious behaviour reporting at train stations 
Despite widespread recognition of the importance of public cooperation for protecting 
mass transit hubs, this is an under-researched area. Most research on countering 
terrorism in this context has focused on technological, organisational and policing 
solutions (Policastro and Gordon, 1999, Plant, 2004, Waugh Jr, 2004). Our literature 
review identified six sources that included some discussion of public involvement in rail 




transit counter-terrorism (Riley, 2004, Loukaitou-Sideris et al., 2006, Kappia et al., 
2009, Jenkins and Trella, 2012, Donald, 2013, Carter et al., 2016). Of these, only three - 
Loukaitou-Sideris et al., Kappia et al. and Carter et al. - involved original data 
collection. Kappia et al. and Carter et al. both present survey data on public 
acceptability of counter-terrorism measures in stations and Loukaitou-Sideris et al. 
employed interviews with transit officials to compare approaches to rail security in four 
national contexts, including the use of public engagement campaigns.  None of these 
studies explored factors influencing reporting behaviours.  
Although not focused specifically on mass transit, FEMA research conducted in 
partnership with the International Association of Chiefs of Police on improving 
community awareness and reporting of terrorism-related suspicious activity does 
provide some insight into reporting behaviours in this context (FEMA, 2012). This 
study employed surveys, focus groups and interviews, including questions on locations 
where people would be the most likely to be aware of and report suspicious activity. 
Focus group and surveys identified airports and mass transit systems as sites where 
participants felt they would be most likely ‘to be on the lookout for suspicious activity’ 
(p11). However, this research also found important differences between official and lay 
understandings of what constitutes suspicious activity, with the public tending to focus 
on traditional criminal activity, such as car theft. In fact, only 5% of their sample 
described activities that could be indicative of terrorism (p7).  
Key barriers to reporting clustered around interpersonal factors (e.g. concern 
about getting an innocent person into trouble and fear of retaliation) and instrumental 
assessments about reporting procedures; specifically, uncertainty in relation to (a) how 
to report, (b) whether the report will be taken seriously, and (c) whether reporting would 
be a worthwhile use of police resources. Fear or mistrust of law enforcement was also 




identified as a potential barrier. Based on these findings, FEMA make seven 
recommendations for improving community awareness and reporting of terrorism-
related suspicious activities, arguing that public education efforts should focus on the 
importance of reporting and provide a better understanding of what suspicious activity 
entails. This report also highlights the need for the provision of clear and concise 
reporting mechanisms.  
Police cooperation, procedural justice and social identification 
It is well established within the criminological literature that public cooperation is a 
crucial element of effective policing and crime prevention (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003, 
Murphy et al., 2008, LaFree and Adamczyk, 2017). Extensive survey research in the US 
has compared instrumental and procedural justice models of policing, exploring the 
relative influence of risk and performance (i.e. judgements regarding police efficacy in 
managing crime) and the perceived fairness of police procedures and personal 
encounters with the public (procedural justice) on cooperation (Lind and Tyler, 1988, 
Tyler and Huo, 2002, Sunshine and Tyler, 2003). This research has established strong 
and consistent links between fairness of procedures, legitimacy of police authority and 
willingness to cooperate with the police (Bradford, 2014).  
There are several models that have been used to explain the psychology of 
procedural justice. The group engagement model (Tyler and Blader, 2003) builds on the 
group-value model (Lind and Tyler, 1988) and relational model (Tyler and Lind, 1992) 
to explain why procedural justice influences cooperation. All of these models are 
empirically supported and emphasise the relational implications of justice evaluations, 
but the group engagement model has a broader scope and foregrounds the role of 
identity judgements in cooperative behaviour, as conceptualised in self-categorisation 
theory (Turner, 1999). From this perspective, the primary driver for police cooperation 




is the extent to which the public believe they share group membership with the police, 
based on common values and a shared interest in maintaining group norms. Interactions 
with the police that are considered fair promote a sense of shared identity, which in turn 
encourages cooperation – i.e. social identification with the police mediates the 
relationship between procedural justice and police cooperation. This hypothesis has 
been supported in both a US and UK context (Tyler and Blader, 2003, Bradford, 2014). 
Whilst there is good evidence that procedural justice influences public 
cooperation with the police in relation to crime in general, this does not necessarily 
mean that it will hold in the context of reporting terrorism-related suspicious behaviour 
in train stations. There is evidence of procedural justice effects on cooperation for 
counter-terrorism community policing amongst Muslims in the US (Tyler et al., 2010), 
UK (Huq et al., 2011) and Australia (Murphy et al., 2017), which suggests that this 
approach has a broader scope than general crime control. However, as with earlier 
research these studies focus on community policing, and transit policing operates in a 
very different environment, which may have both positive and negative impacts on 
willingness to cooperate. This includes, but is not limited to the witness being less likely 
to know the perpetrator, being potentially more or less familiar with situational 
behavioural norms (depending on whether they are a regular passenger) and being in a 
crowded, time-pressured environment that is conducive to bystander effects (Fischer et 
al., 2011).  
Additionally, police operating in a mass transit environment will not have the 
opportunity that community police have to develop long term relationships with 
citizens. Therefore, the public may not be as well placed to assess the fairness of police 
interactions in this context. Furthermore, procedures for redressing transport policing 
complaints may be less familiar or accessible than for the regular force. If it is assumed 




that the public treat ‘the police’ as a social category, it is not unreasonable to expect that 
personal encounters with community police may be used as a basis for judgments about 
procedural justice that will transfer to different policing contexts. However, this may 
not be the case in the UK, where railways are policed by British Transport Police 
(BTP), a specialised unit which operates under an independent body that is funded by 
train companies (Railways and Transport Safety Act, 2003).  
There is evidence to suggest that most of the UK public are aware that BTP are 
responsible for policing Britain’s rail network (British Transport Police, 2017). This 
raises questions about whether the group engagement model of procedural justice will 
hold in this context. However, it is not known whether the UK public consider BTP to 
be conceptually different from ‘the police’ or whether it is viewed as a subunit of the 
regular force that would be subject to the same rules and procedures for correcting 
unfair decisions. As Denmark does not have a dedicated police force for its railways, 
the comparative element of this study should help establish whether these distinctions 
matter.  
 Consequently, further empirical evidence is required before it can be assumed 
that factors that influence cooperative behaviours in relation to community counter-
terrorism reporting will hold in the context of policing public transportation systems. 
This notwithstanding, the high value of public reporting for countering terrorism on 
mass transit systems makes this an important context in which to explore factors that 
influence cooperative behaviours (Parker et al., 2017). 
Research questions and hypotheses 
To contribute to a better understanding of the factors that influence public reporting of 
suspicious activity related to hostile reconnaissance on rail networks, we formulated the 
following research questions and hypotheses. 




Our first research question focused on the impact of uncertainty on intention to 
report suspicious behaviour in train stations. Specifically, in line with FEMA (2012) 
and Lafree and Adamczyk (2017) which suggests that people will be less likely to 
report in situations of uncertainty, Hypothesis 1 states that people will be more likely to 
intend reporting unattended items (a familiar request which involves high levels of 
certainty) than suspicious behaviour, which is more difficult to recognise. To further 
examine the impact of uncertainty, we presented our participants with a two-stage 
scenario which described a young man filming CCTV cameras in a train station. We 
used this scenario to test Hypothesis 2, that people will be more likely to intend 
reporting suspicious behaviour if they are provided with information to reduce 
uncertainty about the activity they are observing. 
Our second research question focused on individual level factors predicting 
willingness to cooperate with the police for general crime reporting in comparison with 
reporting suspicious behaviour in train stations. In line with Tyler and Blader (2003) 
and Bradford (2014), Hypothesis 3 is that procedural justice will predict police 
cooperation for general crime, but this relationship will be mediated by social 
identification with the police. If procedural justice theory holds in the context of transit 
policing, Hypothesis 4 will find that procedural justice also predicts willingness to 
report suspicious behaviour in a train station via its impact on social identification with 
the police.  
Our final research question focused on the impact of the ’See it. Say it. Sorted’ 
campaign on reporting intentions in response to our CCTV filming scenario. 
Specifically, Hypothesis 5 holds that provision of information will increase reporting 
intention and Hypothesis 6 is that people who see the full ’See it. Say it. Sorted’ 
guidance will be more likely to intend reporting than people who are not exposed to the 




‘sorted’ element. This final hypothesis is in line with FEMA (2012) research which 
identified concerns over whether reports will be taken seriously or be a worthwhile use 
of police resources as barriers to reporting suspicious behaviour. It is also consistent 
with instrumental explanations of cooperation which focus on police effectiveness. 
Due to local experiences and relationships with the police that could both 
increase and decrease reporting intentions in the UK and Denmark, the cross-national 




In order to investigate factors that influence intention to report suspicious behaviours on 
rail networks, including the impact of the British Transport Police (BTP) ’See it. Say it. 
Sorted’ (SiSiS) campaign, this study employed a survey experiment in which 
participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: (1) no information 
(control), (2) ‘See it, Say it’ information (Condition 1), and (3) ‘See it, Say it, Sorted’ 
information (Condition 2). Initial questions, which were presented to all participants, 
included baseline measures of reporting intention for general crime and for unattended 
items and suspicious behaviour in train stations. This not only allowed us to identify 
whether intention to report was higher or lower in the context of protecting crowded 
places from terrorism in comparison with general crime control, but also enabled us to 
test the hypothesis that people would be more inclined to report unattended items in 
train stations, due to lack of certainty regarding what constitutes suspicious behaviour in 
this context. 




Participants in Condition 1 were shown ‘See it, say it’ guidance which states that 
‘we’ve all got a role to play in keeping the rail network safe’ and asks the reader to 
remain vigilant and report anything that seems out of place or unusual. This guidance 
also includes a list of things to look out for (e.g. someone who could be concealing 
something under their clothing) and says that the police would like to hear from them ‘if 
you see something that doesn’t feel right’. It also instructs the reader to let the police 
decide if what they have seen or what they know is important and asks them to ‘tell a 
member of rail staff or police officer what you have seen’. Participants in Condition 2 
were provided with the same information as participants in Condition 1 but were also 
informed that the police will thoroughly check all information they receive and take 
reports seriously. They were then provided with a case study in which suspicious 
behaviour reported by a vigilant passenger led to a man being arrested and charged 
under the Terrorism Act 2000.  
The guidance that was given in both information conditions was reproduced 
directly from the BTP webpage1. However, the example of ‘someone checking security 
arrangements, for example filming CCTV cameras at a station’ was excluded to avoid 
the inclusion of advice directly relating to the hypothetical scenario we employed to 
measure reporting intentions. Whilst it is usual for public information campaigns to try 
to be as precise as possible about required actions, one of the challenges with 
encouraging the reporting of suspicious behaviours is that there is no definitive list of 
behaviours that fall into this category. Consequently, providing a short list of exemplar 
behaviours runs the risk of unintentionally suggesting to the public that these are the 
                                                 
1 http://www.btp.police.uk/advice_and_information/see_it_say_it_sorted.aspx 




only activities of interest to the police. It is therefore important to understand the impact 
of the campaign on non-specified behaviours.  
A two-stage hypothetical scenario which described suspicious behaviour in a 
train station was used to further explore the role of uncertainty and to test the impact of 
SiSiS guidance. At Stage 1 (the ‘uncertain threat’ stage), participants were asked to 
imagine that they are sitting outside a café in the concourse of a large mainline train 
station waiting for a friend when they observe a young man who seems to be filming 
one of the station’s CCTV cameras on his phone. At Stage 2 (the ‘certain threat’ stage), 
they were asked to imagine that some time had passed since they first observed the 
young man who appeared to be filming and while they have been watching he has been 
moving from camera to camera. They were also informed ‘you are now certain that he 
is recording the location of all CCTV cameras in the train station’.  
Participants and procedure 
Two identical surveys were conducted, one in the UK and one in Denmark, to 
test the impact of messages in different national contexts. The Danish version of the 
survey was a direct translation of the English questionnaire, with minor adaptations that 
were required as the ‘See it, Say it, Sorted’ (SiSiS) guidance was designed to be 
delivered in the UK and there have been no cases in Denmark in which a planned 
terrorist attack was foiled due to public intelligence. When introducing the ‘Sorted’ case 
study, UK participants were therefore told ‘In 2014, the information we received from a 
vigilant train passenger led to a man being arrested under the Terrorism Act’, whereas 
Danish participants were told ’In 2014, information provided to the UK police from a 
vigilant train passenger led to a man being arrested under the Terrorism Act’. The 
survey was conducted over the internet by Lightspeed GMI (GMI) on 1505 UK-based 
and 1500 Danish-based respondents. Of these 1002 (33.3%) were in the control group, 




1001 (33.3%) were in Condition 1 and 1002 (33.3%) were in Condition 2. Participants 
were drawn from GMI UK and Danish panels using conventional opinion poll methods 
to obtain a nationally representative sample of the adult population for each country. 
The sample was selected randomly from online panels based on quota targets for 
gender, age and region. Ethnicity and highest educational qualification were also 
recorded. Participants were compensated for their time using a points-based system, in 
which panel members accumulate points that can be exchanged for cash, vouchers or a 
charity donation. Data was collected between 16th January and 6th February 2017 – 
shortly after the SiSiS campaign had been launched in the UK, but before it had been 
extensively promoted on the UK transport network. A comprehensive set of quality 
control checks were put in place to ensure unique and valid data2.  
Before beginning the questionnaire, participants were informed about the 
purpose of the study and told that they would be presented with some information and 
questions about reporting suspicious activity or unattended items in public places. No 
deception was employed, participants were informed about the way that their data 
would be stored and that they had the right to withdraw their data at any time up until 
the point of submission. The survey was approved by King’s College London’s 
Research Ethics Committee.  
Constructs and measures 
Baseline intention to cooperate with the police was measured using three items (α = .81) 
which replicated Bradford’s (2014) ‘Cooperation with the police’ scale which measures 
intention to report crime, suspicious activity or knowledge about a criminal suspect to 
                                                 
2 See http://www.lightspeedresearch.com/services/lightspeed-quality-suite/ for more details 




the police. Participants were also asked how likely they would be to report an 
unattended item at a train station and how likely they would be to report someone 
behaving suspiciously in a train station. All measures used a five-point response format. 
Possible options were ‘strongly disagree’ (coded as a score of 1), ‘tend to disagree’ (2), 
‘neither agree nor disagree’ (3), ‘tend to agree’ (4), and ‘strongly agree’ (5). Participants 
were also offered a ‘don’t know’ option (coded as missing data). 
Due to survey length considerations, our procedural justice scale (α = .79) 
employed three of five items from Bradford’s (2014) ‘Police procedural justice’ scale. 
These items measured the perceived fairness of police rules and procedures, perceived 
opportunities to correct unfair decisions and whether police decisions were thought to 
be based on facts rather than personal opinions.  We were unable to identify a suitable 
existing scale to measure social identification with the police (previous research has 
used national identity as a proxy, which would not be appropriate for a sample of 
mostly ethnic majority participants). We therefore designed two measures to directly 
measure the extent to which participants considered the police to represent the interests 
and values of their community and used these to form a social identification with police 
scale. This scale was found to be highly reliable (2 items; α = .83). Procedural justice 
and social identity were both measured using the same response options as above.3  
At each stage of our scenario, participants were presented with the same eight 
response options. Three of these represent different ways of reporting the incident, 
either by one of the recommended routes of (a) telling a member of rail staff or police 
officer, or (b) calling the police, or by a non-recommended route of (c) telling a member 
of staff at the café. The latter option was included to provide an understanding of 
                                                 
3 See Appendix for item wording for all constructs and measures used. 




whether the public are likely to consider a member of staff serving them at a station 
outlet to be a suitable authority for reporting potentially suspicious behaviour. If this is 
the case, it has important implications regarding the need to train the staff of private 
businesses operating at mainline train stations on how they should respond to reports of 
suspicious behaviour. The other five behavioural options represented either inaction 
(‘wait and see’ or ‘do nothing’) or taking actions that do not involve reporting (‘leave 
the station’, ‘ask other customers if they think the behaviour looks suspicious’ or ‘ask 
the person taking photos what they are doing’).  Response options were presented in a 
grid format, with the order of statements randomised within each. Possible response 
options were ‘not at all likely’ (coded as a score of 1), ‘not very likely’ (2), ‘uncertain’ 
(3) ‘fairly likely’ (4), and ‘very likely’ (5).  
Analyses  
Hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used to examine predictors of cooperation 
in relation to (a) general willingness to report crime (police cooperation), and (b) 
baseline intention to report suspicious behaviour at a train station (suspicious behaviour 
reporting). In both models, demographic control variables were entered at Step 1, 
followed by procedural justice in Step 2 and social identification with the police in Step 
3. The hypothesis that social identification with the police mediates the effect of 
procedural justice was tested using the PROCESS method (Hayes, 2013). This method 
uses 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals to test indirect effects.  
As we were interested in testing the impact of the ‘See it. Say it. Sorted’ 
campaign on reporting behaviours (i.e. we wanted to be able to directly compare those 
who intended reporting with those who did not), ‘uncertain’ and ‘don’t know’ responses 
were coded as missing data.  Behavioural outcome measures were therefore re-coded 
into binary variables, with ‘not at all likely’ and ‘not very likely’ given a value of 0 (not 




likely), and ‘fairly likely’ and ‘very likely’ given a value of 1 (likely). In addition, 
participants who only intended reporting behaviours were captured by a measure which 
included participants with a score of ‘likely’ for ‘Tell a member of rail staff or a police 
officer’ or ‘Tell a member of staff at the café’ or ‘Call the police’ and a score of 
‘unlikely’ for all other behavioural outcomes. Cochran’s Q tests were used to compare 
responses at each stage to identify the impact of certainty on behavioural intentions. 
Chi-squared tests were used to examine the associations between information received 
and behavioural intentions.  
Results 
Baseline perceptions about the police and reporting intentions 
Table 1 shows demographic characteristics, baseline perceptions about the police and 
baseline reporting intentions by country. [TABLE 1 NEAR HERE] Reported intention 
to cooperate with the police was high in both countries, but perceived procedural justice 
was lower in the UK and British participants were also significantly less likely than 
their Danish counterparts to report a sense of shared identification with the police. 
Reporting intention in the context of a train station was lower than for general crime, 
although most participants in both countries indicated that they would be likely to report 
an unattended item (69.2% UK, 67.2% DK) or suspicious behaviour (64% UK, 52.4% 
DK). UK participants were significantly more likely to intend reporting both unattended 
items (t (2987) = 4.45, p<0.0005) and suspicious behaviour (t (2990) = 9.86, p <0.0005) 
than Danish participants.  
In support of Hypothesis 1, there was more uncertainty with regards to reporting 
suspicious behaviour than unattended items, with 29.2% of UK participants and 30.5% 
of Danish participants indicating they were unsure if they would report suspicious 




behaviour. Consequently, participants were significantly more likely to intend reporting 
an unattended item than suspicious behaviour in both the UK (t=3.63(1504), p<0.0005) 
and Denmark (t=9.52(1499), p<0.0005).  
Impact of certainty on reporting intentions in response to CCTV filming 
scenario 
Table 2 shows that the impact of certainty was consistent across countries. In support of 
Hypothesis 2, confirmation at Stage 2 that the person under observation was recording 
the location of all CCTV cameras in the train station significantly increased intention to 
report via all options provided (all p values <0.0005). However, it had the largest 
impact on intention to call the police, shifting this from a minority to a majority 
intention amongst Danish participants.  It also significantly reduced intention to consult 
other customers for their opinion, to wait for further evidence, and to do nothing. 
However, 65% of UK participants and 70.8% of Danish participants reported that they 
would continue to wait for further evidence at Stage 2, despite this additional 
information. Consequently, the proportion of participants who indicated that they would 
only be likely to report the observed behaviour remained low at Stage 2 (<25%), 
although this did represent a significant increase from Stage 1.  [TABLE 2 NEAR 
HERE] 
Predicting general willingness to cooperate with the police 
To test Hypothesis 3 that evaluations of the fairness of police procedures (‘procedural 
justice’) influences cooperation with police, but that this relationship will be mediated 
by the extent to which the police are considered to share group membership (‘social 
identification with the police’), a hierarchical regression analysis was performed. 
Demographic control variables were entered at Step 1, ‘procedural justice’ was added at 




Step 2 and ‘social identification with the police’ at Step 3. Table 3 presents the findings 
of this analysis [TABLE 3 NEAR HERE].  
Step 3 shows very similar effects in the UK and Danish data, with ‘social 
identification with the police’, ‘procedural justice’ and ‘age’ significantly predicting 
police cooperation in both countries. Specifically, older participants were more likely to 
cooperate with the police (β=0.13, p<0.0005 in the UK; β=0.17, p<0.0005 in Denmark), 
as were those who believed that police procedures are fair (β=0.19, p<0.0005 in the UK; 
β=0.13, p<0.0005 in Denmark) and felt a shared sense of identification with the police 
(β=0.28, p<0.0005 in both countries). In the UK, ‘gender’ and ‘ethnicity’ were also 
significant predictors, although standardised regression coefficients show that these 
were relatively small effects (0.06 and -0.06 respectively). The effect of ‘procedural 
justice’ on ‘police cooperation’ was substantially reduced in both countries with the 
introduction of ‘social identification with the police’ at Step 3. This suggests that social 
identification partially mediated the association between ‘procedural justice’ and 
willingness to cooperate with the police. Figure 1 confirms that there was a significant 
indirect effect of procedural justice on police cooperation through social identification 
with the police in the UK, ab = 0.18, BCa CI [0.13,0.23], PM = 0.55. The Danish data 
also showed a significant indirect effect of procedural justice on police cooperation 
through social identification with the police, ab = 0.21, BCa CI [0.15,0.26], PM = 0.69. 
Hypothesis 3 is therefore also supported. [FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE] 
Predicting willingness to report suspicious behaviour at train stations 
To test whether the predicted impacts of ‘procedural justice’ and ‘social identification 
with the police’ hold in the context of reporting suspicious behaviour at train stations, 
another hierarchical regression analysis was performed using the same predictor 
variables with ‘suspicious behaviour reporting’ as the outcome variable. The results of 




this analysis are presented in Table 4.  [TABLE 4 NEAR HERE] 
Step 3 of the analysis shows that as for police cooperation, ‘age’, ‘procedural 
justice’ and ‘social identification’ significantly predicted intention to report suspicious 
behaviour in the context of a train station. In the UK, each of these predictors make a 
very similar contribution to the model, with standardised β- values of 0.10, 0.12 and 
0.11 respectively.  However, the Danish data shows a larger effect of ‘age’ (β = 0.25, 
p<0.0005) than ‘procedural justice’ (β = 0.09, p<0.05) or ‘social identification with the 
police’ (β = 0.11, p<0.005). As for police cooperation, intention to report suspicious 
behaviour increased with age. Consistent with the mediation hypothesis, the 
introduction of ‘social identification with the police’ at Step 3 reduces the effect of 
‘procedural justice’ on intention to report suspicious behaviour at a train station. Data 
shown in Figure 2 confirms that there is a significant indirect effect of procedural 
justice on suspicious behaviour reporting through social identification with the police in 
both UK (ab = 0.10, BCa CI [0.02,0.17], PM = 0.43) and Danish (ab = 0.15, BCa CI 
[0.19,0.22], PM = 0.66) samples. Despite similarities in the effect of ‘procedural justice’ 
and ‘social identification with the police’ on ‘suspicious behaviour reporting’, which 
provide support for Hypothesis 4, adjusted R2 values show that this model only accounts 
for 7% of the variance in ‘suspicious behaviour reporting’ in the UK and 11% in 
Denmark, in comparison with 23% (UK) and 21% (Denmark) of variation in ‘police 
cooperation’. [FIGURE 2 NEAR HERE] 
Impact of ’See it. Say it. Sorted’ (SiSiS) campaign on reporting intentions in 
response to CCTV filming scenario 
Table 5 shows that SiSiS guidance had a significant positive impact on UK participants’ 
intention to report using all three options provided at Stage 1. It also significantly 
influenced their intention to tell a member of staff at the café and to call the police at 




Stage 2. Information provision no longer influenced intention to tell a member of rail 
staff at Stage 2, but >90% of UK participants indicated they would report via this route 
at this stage, irrespective of condition. In Denmark, SiSiS guidance increased intention 
to call the police at both stages of the scenario. At Stage 2, it also increased intention to 
tell a member of rail staff or the police. We therefore found some support for the 
hypothesis that SiSiS will increase intention to report (Hypothesis 5) in both national 
contexts. However, information provision did not have a significant impact on the more 
conservative measure of respondents who only intended reporting behaviours in either 
country. [TABLE 5 NEAR HERE] 
Pairwise comparisons were used to test the hypothesis that people who see the full 
SiSiS guidance will be more likely to intend reporting than those who are not exposed 
to the ‘sorted element’ (Hypothesis 6). UK data showed that provision of additional 
information increased intention to call the police at both Stage 1 (χ2 = 4.70, p =0.03) 
and Stage 2 (χ2 = 6.33, p =0.01). Likewise, the ‘sorted’ information was required to 
encourage Danish participants to call the police at both Stage 1 (χ2 = 6.97, p =0.01) and 
Stage 2 (χ2 = 9.36, p =0.002). However, ‘See it, Say it’ information was sufficient to 
encourage UK participants to tell a member of rail staff or a police officer (χ2 = 11.81, p 
=0.001) and to tell a member of staff at the café (χ2 = 5.05, p =0.03) at Stage 1. 
Similarly, at Stage 2, whilst both information types increased intention amongst UK 
participants to tell a member of staff at the café, there was no additional impact from 
exposing participants to the ‘sorted’ message (χ2 = 0.04, p =0.84). We therefore found 
partial support for the hypothesis that providing information about how the police act on 
reports will encourage the reporting of suspicious behaviour.  




Impact of national context on intention to report in response to CCTV filming 
scenario 
Taking into account national differences in education, ethnicity, perceptions about 
procedural justice and social identification with the police, UK participants were 
significantly more likely to tell a member of rail staff or police at both Stage 1 of the 
scenario (adjusted odds ratio 2.62, 95% confidence interval 2.08-3.30, p<0.0005) and at 
Stage 2 of the scenario (adjusted odds ratio 2.99, 95% confidence interval 2.07-4.33, 
p<0.0005). They were also more likely to intend calling the police at both Stage 1 
(adjusted odds ratio 1.59, 95% confidence interval 1.29-1.97, p<0.0005) and Stage 2 
(adjusted odds ratio 1.55, 95% confidence interval 1.23-1.97, p<0.0005). UK 
participants also had 1.89 higher odds of intending to tell a member of staff at the café 
at Stage 1 (95% confidence interval 1.55-2.30, p<0.0005), but there was no association 
between country and this intention at Stage 2 (adjusted odds ratio 1.18, 95% confidence 
interval 0.95-1.45, p=0.14). Overall, UK participants were significantly more likely than 
Danish participants to intend only reporting behaviours at both Stage 1 (adjusted odds 
ratio 2.00, 95% confidence interval 1.37-2.93, p<0.0005) and Stage 2 (adjusted odds 
ratio 1.74, 95% confidence interval 1.42-2.13, p<0.0005) of the scenario. 
Discussion 
The primary aim of this study was to contribute to the empirical evidence base on police 
cooperation in the context of countering mass transit terrorism. Specifically, to support 
a better understanding of the factors that influence public reporting of suspicious 
activity related to hostile reconnaissance on rail networks. To meet this aim, we 
examined the influence of the nature of the cooperative request being made (reporting 
suspicious behaviour on rail networks vs. suspect packages and traditional criminal 
activity) and tested whether established drivers for police cooperation (procedural 




fairness and social identification) hold in the context of mass transit policing. We also 
used the UK ‘See it. Say it. Sorted’ (SiSiS) campaign to test the influence of direct 
requests for public vigilance and reporting, as well as the impact of providing 
information about expected benefits of reporting. 
Given the potentially greater challenge of identifying what constitutes 
‘suspicious’ behaviour in comparison with recognising a suspect package, we 
hypothesised that people would be less likely to intend reporting both non-specified 
suspicious activity (e.g. ‘someone behaving suspiciously in a train station’) and 
someone filming station CCTV cameras than unattended items or traditional criminal 
activity. Our results support this contention and add to existing literature which suggests 
that people are unwilling to report terrorism-related behaviours if they are not certain 
that they relate to attack planning (LaFree and Adamczyk, 2017).  Furthermore, we 
found that even after introducing certainty about the behaviour under observation at 
Stage 2 of the scenario, most people reported that they would continue to wait for 
further evidence. This suggests that in the absence of being explicitly told that the 
filming of CCTV cameras may be indicative of hostile reconnaissance, the public are 
unlikely to consider this to be a behaviour of concern. This is consistent with the FEMA 
(2012) finding that official and lay definitions of suspicious activity differ.  
To explore whether well-established determinants of cooperation for community 
policing hold in the context of appeals to the public to report suspicious behaviour on 
railways, we examined the impact of procedural justice on reporting intention via its 
influence on social identification with the police. We replicated Bradford’s (2014) 
finding that social identity mediates the impact of procedural justice on cooperation 
with the police for general crime. This provides further evidence that in order to 
effectively engage communities, the police need to pay attention to perceived fairness in 




the way that they interact with the public. We also found that this prediction held for 
reporting someone behaving suspiciously at a train station, suggesting that views about 
‘the police’ in general transfer to reporting intentions beyond community policing. 
However, the effects of procedural justice and social identification with the police were 
much smaller than for general crime. In fact, our Danish data indicated that perceptions 
about the police had substantially less influence than age in this context, with older 
participants most likely to demonstrate willingness to report.  
This suggests that whilst perceptions about the fairness of police procedures in 
general matter for reporting on rail networks, they are unlikely to be the primary driver 
for cooperation in this context. The positive impact of the ‘sorted’ element of the SiSiS 
campaign on intention to call the police indicates that assessments regarding the 
benefits of reporting may be more important. This is counter to what would be predicted 
by research which found that procedural justice can better explain cooperation with 
counter-terrorism policing than instrumental concerns (Huq et al., 2011). However, this 
may be explained by the very positive assessments of police fairness within our sample, 
as previous research has found that police efficacy is most likely to be a driver for 
reporting in contexts where there are particularly positive attitudes towards the police 
(Torrente et al., 2017). It is also consistent with the FEMA (2012) finding that concern 
as to whether reports would be taken seriously or represent a worthwhile use of police 
resources are key barriers to reporting terrorism-related suspicious activity. This study 
therefore supports the current UK approach to encouraging reporting on rail networks, 
which emphasises that the police will take reports seriously and that public vigilance 
has led to successful prosecutions under the UK Terrorism Act. 
Although this study provides evidence that the SiSiS campaign is effective in 
encouraging reporting, it also highlights several issues that need to be taken into 




consideration for future public outreach activities. Firstly, whilst the most common 
reporting intention at both stages of the scenario was, as recommended, to tell a member 
of rail staff or police officer. Most people indicated that they would also be likely to 
consider reporting the incident to a member of staff at a café on the station concourse. 
This coupled with the impact of perceived response efficacy (the ‘sorted’ element of the 
guidance) on intention to report, highlights the importance of the provision of training 
on how to respond to reports; not only for those who have direct responsibility for 
security at mass transportation hubs, but also to staff working for private retail outlets 
operating in and around train stations. That the SiSiS guidance increased intention to 
report someone filming station CCTV cameras, despite that fact that we removed this 
specific example from the ‘what to look out for’ list provides some reassurance that 
public vigilance campaigns can work for non-specified behaviours. However, the very 
large proportion of participants who indicated that they would continue to ‘wait for 
more evidence’ at the second stage of our scenario suggests that the inclusion of 
specific behaviours in public vigilance campaigns may increase reporting intention. 
Further research using multiple scenarios is required to confirm this. 
Finally, cross-national comparisons found that although UK participants were 
less likely than their Danish counterparts to consider police procedures to be fair and to 
feel a shared sense of identification with the police, they were nonetheless more likely 
to intend reporting both unattended items and suspicious behaviour at train stations. 
They were also more likely to intend reporting someone filming CCTV camera at a 
train station using all options provided at both stages of our scenario. This suggests that 
previous experience of mass transit terrorism and/or expectations regarding the 
likelihood of a future attack (i.e. threat appraisal) may have more influence on intention 
to report in this context than for general crime reporting. It may also reflect that 




sustained exposure to public vigilance campaigns in the UK has developed a reporting 
norm, although further research is required to confirm this.  
Despite these national differences, we did find very similar patterns for the 
influence of perceived fairness of police procedures on cooperation via increasing social 
identification in the UK and Denmark. This provides additional empirical support for 
relational models of procedural justice developed by Tyler and colleagues (Lind and 
Tyler, 1988, Tyler and Lind, 1992, Tyler and Huo, 2002, Tyler and Blader, 2003). It 
also suggests that the reduced influence of procedural justice in the context of policing 
railways is more likely to do with the reporting environment than the fact that UK 
participants were differentiating between British Transport Police and regular police 
forces. Furthermore, strong similarities in the influence of the SiSiS campaign on 
reporting intentions in each country suggest that public vigilance campaigns developed 
in the UK are likely to be suitable for use in other European contexts. Future research 
using countries that vary along different dimensions (for example that share experience 
of terrorism but differ in levels of trust in the police) would be useful to establish wider 
applicability.   
Methodological limitations 
Our study measured reporting intentions rather than actual reports. This approach 
allowed us to target a large demographically representative sample in each country. 
However, it makes it difficult to establish whether our results reflect real-life reporting 
behaviour, particularly for participants in the experimental conditions who received 
SiSiS guidance which establishes reporting as a socially desirable activity. The use of 
an online survey which is administered by software reduces social desirability bias in 
comparison with interviewer-based methods (Schlenger and Silver, 2006). Furthermore, 
we also included a conservative measure of ‘reporting behaviours’, which only included 




participants who indicated that they would report using any of the three routes provided, 
but not also intend non-reporting behaviours. This approach provides transparency 
regarding the gap between stated and likely intentions to avoid over-stating likelihood 
of reporting.  
A further potential limitation relates to sample selection based on 
representativeness of national population rather than focusing solely on the regular 
railway travelling public. This may underestimate likelihood of reporting, as those less 
familiar with the railway environment may be less likely to recognise behaviour that is 
out of the ordinary. High levels of intended reporting in response to our scenario 
suggest that this is unlikely to have had a major impact, but future research should 
consider specifically targeting rail passengers. Reassurance that the observed impact of 
the SiSiS guidance is not a methodological artefact is provided by the fact that the 
British Transport Police received a monthly average of 167 texts or calls reporting 
something that seemed out of place or unusual prior to the launch of the SiSiS campaign 
in November 2016, but since its launch this figure has risen to an average of 283 reports 
per month4. Future research into the quality of these reports would be extremely useful 
to establish whether concerns about the burden of over-reporting expressed by transit 
officials to Loukaitou-Sideris et al. (2006) are well founded or if this represents 
genuinely useful additional information. 
                                                 
4 Figures provided on request by the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), 
the lead UK government authority for protective security advice (https://www.cpni.gov.uk/) 
 





This study has contributed empirical evidence on factors that influence public reporting 
of suspicious behaviours on rail networks, a topic that has received relatively little 
academic attention to date. In so doing it has shown that the influence of procedural 
justice on social identification and police cooperation is likely to hold beyond the 
context of community policing. It does, however, also suggest that instrumental 
concerns are likely to influence cooperation in this context. Additionally, our results 
demonstrate that public vigilance campaigns can successfully encourage reporting of 
suspicious behaviour on rail networks. However, our data also identified several issues 
that need to be taken into consideration for future campaigns. Namely, that lay and 
official definitions of what constitutes suspicious behaviour may differ and that the 
public may not only report to police and rail staff, but also to other people working in 
the area who may not have received security training. Despite baseline national 
differences in perceptions about the police and willingness to report, the ‘See it. Say it. 
Sorted’ campaign increased intention to call the police in response to a suspicious 
behaviour scenario in both the UK and Denmark. This suggests that public vigilance 
campaigns developed in the UK are likely to be suitable for use in other European 
contexts. 
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Table 1. Sample characteristics, baseline perceptions of police and reporting intentions 
 



































χ2 = 0.84, p = 0.66 
 
Education  
No higher education 
Vocational qualification 








































Perceptions about the police 









t (2707) = -8.81*, p <0.0005 
Social identification with police 3.87 (0.91) 4.22 (0.80) t (2868) = -10.88*, p <0.0005 
 
Reporting intentions 
   
 






t (3003) = 0.48, p =0.63 
 
Unattended items (train station) 3.91 (0.99) 3.74 (1.06) t (2987) = 4.45*, p<0.0005 
    
Suspicious behaviour (train station) 3.83 (0.92) 3.49 (0.98) t (2990) = 9.86*, p <0.0005 
    
* Since preliminary Levene’s tests indicated that the variances of the two groups were significantly different, the t-tests reported 
here do not assume equal variances. 




Table 2. Frequencies (percentages) for behavioural intentions by scenario stage 
 
Behavioural intention   Frequency (%)  Sig 
 UK  Denmark  
 Stage 1 Stage 2  Stage 1 Stage 2  










Cochran’s Q = 98.85, 








Cochran’s Q = 181.70, 
p < 0.0005 
 
Tell a member of staff at the cafe: 












Cochran’s Q = 27.57, 











Cochran’s Q = 88.09, 
p < 0.0005 
 










Cochran’s Q = 114.29, 








Cochran’s Q = 214.43, 
p < 0.0005 
 













Cochran’s Q = 6.31, 











Cochran’s Q = 19.64, 
p < 0.0005 
 













Cochran’s Q = 215.05, 











Cochran’s Q = 162.19, 












Cochran’s Q = 116.67, 








Cochran’s Q = 154.86, 
p < 0.0005 
 










Cochran’s Q = 2.00, 








Cochran’s Q = 3.75, 
p = 0.05 
 











Cochran’s Q = 0.11, 








Cochran’s Q = 0.93, 
p = 0.34 
Intend only reporting behaviours: 









Cochran’s Q = 230.29, 








Cochran’s Q = 174.38, 
p < 0.0005 
an values <1505 (UK) and <1500 (DK) as only respondents who gave valid responses for the same item at both stages were included in this analysis  





Table 3. Multiple regression predicting police cooperation 
 
 
                               
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
 β (SE) Stand. β β (SE) Stand. β β (SE) Stand. β 
UK data       
Constant 3.78 (0.08)  2.66 (0.10)  2.50 (0.10)  
Age 0.08 (0.01) 0.16*** 0.07 (0.01) 0.14*** 0.07 (0.01) 0.13*** 
Gender 
(0 = male) 
0.09 (0.04) 0.06* 0.08 (0.03) 0.06* 0.08 (0.03) 0.06* 
Ethnicity 
(0 = White British) 
-0.17 (0.05) -0.09** -0.12 (0.05) -0.06* -0.12 (0.05) -0.06* 
Education1 
(0=no higher, 1 = vocational) 
0.02 (0.06) 0.01 0.06 (0.06) 0.03 0.04 (0.06) 0.02 
Education2 
(0=no higher, 1 = higher) 
0.09 (0.04) 0.06* 0.07 (0.04) 0.05 0.05 (0.04) 0.04 
Procedural Justice   0.31 (0.02) 0.40*** 0.14 (0.03) 0.19*** 
Social identification with police     0.21 (0.03) 0.28*** 
       
R2 0.04 0.20 0.23 
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.20 0.23 
R2 change 0.04 0.16 0.03 
F change 11.09*** 269.04*** 51.97*** 
df 1343 1342 1341 
Danish data       
Constant 3.60 (0.08)  2.56 (0.11)  2.33 (0.11)  
Age 0.11 (0.01) 0.22*** 0.10 (0.01) 0.20*** 0.09 (0.01) 0.17*** 
Gender 
(0 = male) 
0.09 (0.04) 0.07* 0.07 (0.04) 0.05* 0.06 (0.03) 0.05 
Ethnicity 
(0 = White Danish) 
-0.08 (0.07) -0.03 -0.10 (0.07) -0.04 -0.06 (0.06) -0.03 
Education1 
(0=no higher, 1 = vocational) 
0.11 (0.05) 0.08* 0.08 (0.04) 0.06 0.06 (0.04) 0.04 
Education2 
(0=no higher, 1 = higher) 
0.08 (0.05) 0.05 0.06 (0.04) 0.04 0.05 (0.04) 0.03 
Procedural Justice   0.28 (0.02) 0.33*** 0.11 (0.03) 0.13*** 
Social identification with police     0.23 (0.03) 0.28*** 
       
R2 0.07 0.17 0.21 
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.17 0.20 
R2 change 0.07 0.11 0.04 
F change 18.17*** 168.34*** 57.45** 
df 1316 1315 1314 
* p<0.05; **p<0.001; ***p<0.0005 
 
 




Table 4. Multiple regression predicting suspicious behaviour reporting intention 
 
 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
 β (SE) Stand. β β (SE) Stand. β β (SE) Stand. β 
UK data       
Constant 3.74 (0.11)  2.97 (0.15)  2.89 (0.15)  
Age 0.08 (0.02) 0.11*** 0.07 (0.02) 0.10** 0.07 (0.02) 0.10** 
Gender 
(0 = male) 
-0.05 (0.05) -0.03 -0.06 (0.05) -0.03 -0.06 (0.05) -0.03 
Ethnicity 
(0 = White British) 
-0.01 (0.07) -0.01 0.02 (0.07) 
 
0.01 0.02 (0.07) 0.01 
Education1 
(0=no higher, 1 = vocational) 
-0.18 (0.08) -0.06* -0.15 (0.08) -0.05 -0.16 (0.08) -0.05 
Education2 
(0=no higher, 1 = higher) 
-0.07 (0.05) -0.04 -0.08 (0.05) -0.05 -0.09 (0.05) -0.05 
Procedural Justice   0.22 (0.03) 0.21*** 0.13 (0.04) 0.12* 









Adjusted R2 0.01 0.06 0.06 
R2 change 0.02 0.04 0.01 
F change 4.87*** 62.69** 6.96* 
df 1343 1342 1341 
Danish data       
Constant 2.82 (0.11)  2.03 (0.16)  1.90 (0.17)  
Age 0.20 (0.02) 0.27*** 0.19 (0.02) 0.26*** 0.18 (0.02) 0.25*** 
Gender 
(0 = male) 
0.02 (0.05) 0.01 0.01 (0.05) 0.003 0.001 (0.05) 0.001 
Ethnicity 
(0 = White Danish) 
0.15 (0.10) 0.04 0.14 (0.10) 0.04 0.16 (0.10) 0.04 
Education1 
(0=no higher, 1 = vocational) 
0.05 (0.07) 0.02 0.02 (0.07) 0.01 0.01 (0.07) 0.004 
Education2 
(0=no higher, 1 = higher) 
-0.03 (0.07) -0.01 -0.04 (0.07) -0.02 -0.05 (0.07) -0.02 
Procedural Justice   0.21 (0.03) 0.17*** 0.11 (0.05) 0.09* 









Adjusted R2 0.07 0.10 0.11 
R2 change 0.08 0.03 0.01 
F change 21.56*** 42.89*** 8.61* 
df 1316 1315 1314 
* p<0.05; **p<0.001; ***p<0.0005 




Table 5: Frequencies (percentages) for reporting intentions by condition 
 
Behavioural intention UK  Denmark  
 Control  Condition 1 Condition 2  Control  Condition 1 Condition 2  
STAGE 1 
 
        
























χ2 = 4.59, p =0.10 
 
Tell a member of staff at the cafe: 
































χ2 = 2.51, p = 0.29 
 
 
































χ2 = 11.57, p =0.003 
 
Intend only reporting behaviours: 































χ2 = 1.76, p = 0.42 
         
STAGE 2 
 
        
























χ2 = 11.31, p = 0.003 
 
Tell a member of staff at the cafe: 
































χ2 = 0.01, p = 0.99 
 
 
































χ2 = 9.38, p = 0.01 
 
Intend only reporting behaviours: 
Do not intend 






























χ2 = 5.10, p = 0.08 
a n<500 per condition due to ‘don’t know’ responses being coded as missing data 
















Figure 2: Direct and indirect effects of procedural justice on intention to report 
suspicious behaviour 
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The police use rules and procedures that are fair to everyone 
The police make decisions based on facts, rather than their own personal opinions 
The police provide opportunity for unfair decisions to be corrected 
 
Social identity 
The police represent the values of our community 
The police uphold the values of our community 
 
Police cooperation 
If the situation arose, how like would you be to […] 
Call the police if you witnessed a crime 
Report suspicious activity to the police 
Provide information about a suspect to the police 
 
 
